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Read Only is where the Generate Token sheet starts, and it is the right level for a client that only reads. Move to Read & Write when an agent has to change data, and to Full Access for destructive statements through confirm_destructive_operation. The plaintext is shown once at creation and never again; what persists is a salted SHA-256 hash in the login keychain.
MCP tokensMCP tokens

The MCP tab in Settings

Permission levels

connections:display sits outside the levels. Only pairing grants it, and only while Allow apps to list connections hidden from AI is on under Settings > MCP > Connection Access. The Generate Token sheet never does. It does one thing: lets list_connections take purpose: "display". A token holding it reads Lists connections hidden from AI in the token list. confirm_destructive_operation also needs the connection’s external access to be Read & Write, and no permission level skips the user’s approval. Scopes and gates names which tools sit on which scope.

No token, no access

A request with no Authorization header gets 401 with a Bearer challenge, from your own Mac as much as from anywhere else. There is no setting that admits a caller without a token. The server is loopback only, with no remote mode.

Connection allowlist

A token grants access to all connections or to a named set. A call that targets a connection outside the set is refused with -33007 before any other check runs, and aggregate reads such as search_query_history and list_recent_tabs filter their results to the allowlist whether or not you passed a connection id.

Combining with external access

The effective permission is the lower of the token’s scope and the connection’s External Clients level.

Creating a token

Pairing is the usual route: see Pairing. To mint one by hand, open Settings > MCP > Authentication, click Generate Token, and pick a name, permission level, connection allowlist and expiry. The plaintext is shown once.

Expiry

Optional, and worth setting for anything with write access. The sheet offers 30, 60 and 90 days, a custom date, or Never. An expired token stops authenticating: requests get -33008 with HTTP 401 and WWW-Authenticate: Bearer error="invalid_token", error_description="token expired".

Rotating a token

Mint the replacement before you retire the old one; two tokens for one client are fine, and pairing the same client twice does exactly this. Point the client at the new token, confirm it works, then revoke the old one. Revoking first cuts the client off mid-call, because revocation takes effect immediately.

Revocation

The token list in Settings > MCP > Authentication shows prefix, name, permission level, allowlist, last use, and expiry. Each row offers:
  • Revoke: marks the token inactive. It stays in the list and cannot be reactivated.
  • Delete…: removes the row entirely.
Revoking cancels every request that token has in flight and clears the connection approvals the user had granted it, so a re-issued token has to ask again. The next call gets -33009 with HTTP 401. Disconnect in the Connected Clients list revokes the token of a client that holds its own. It is not a soft disconnect: the client has to pair again or be given a new token. A client on the stdio bridge is the exception, under The stdio bridge token. For the bundled macOS command, follow Status and pairing to replace or remove its token. Its revocation route is private.

The stdio bridge token

Every server start mints a token named __stdio_bridge__ and writes it into the handshake file for the bundled bridge. The bridge sends it over the private socket after checking the socket and host process. It is Read & Write, so an agent going through the bridge can read and write but cannot call confirm_destructive_operation. It expires after an hour and is rotated 15 minutes before that, deleted when the server stops, and any stale copy is removed the next time the store loads. It is hidden from the Settings token list, though its name can appear in the activity log. For a narrower scope, skip the bridge and connect over HTTP with a token you mint. Renewing the token does not cancel work. The old token stops authenticating at once and the bridge picks up the new one, but a request the old token already started, such as a long query or one waiting on a Safe Mode prompt, keeps running until the old token’s own expiry, 15 minutes after the renewal. Every stdio client shares this token, and Connected Clients lists each one by the name it sends, across renewals. Disconnect on one of them cancels that client’s requests in flight and revokes nothing: the others keep working, and the disconnected one can send new requests at once. Remove TablePro from it in Connect a Client…, or turn off the server, to stop it.

Stored fields

The plaintext is tp_ followed by 32 base64url-encoded random bytes. Tokens live in the login keychain under the com.TablePro service; a pre-existing mcp-tokens.json is migrated in on first load and deleted.

Activity log

Every authentication, tool call, resource read, and query is recorded in ~/Library/Application Support/TablePro/mcp-audit.db with the token id, never the plaintext. Open it with Settings > MCP > View Activity…. Statement text is not stored. A query.executed row carries sqlDigest, the SHA-256 of the statement, alongside its duration and row count, which is enough to match a row against a statement you already hold. Error text that is stored is redacted and truncated first. Entries are chained: each row’s hash covers the previous one, so a row cannot be removed or edited without breaking the chain. Entries older than 90 days are pruned when the store opens.

Rate limits

Request limits are keyed by token id, and subscriptions/listen is exempt. Failed auth attempts are counted per client address, and every client on the Mac shares one, so a client that keeps sending a bad token locks the others out too. A malformed Authorization header, a scheme other than Bearer, and an unknown, expired or revoked token each count. A request with no Authorization header gets the 401 challenge and does not count. A successful auth clears the count. Anything over a limit returns -33010 with HTTP 429 and a Retry-After header. Transport limits such as the body cap are on MCP Protocol.

What a token cannot do

export_data can write a new file in Downloads under its path rules. SQL statements that reach the filesystem or run server-side code are refused before they reach the driver, on every tool, along with the rest of what no external caller may send. The reachable surface is the tool catalog, the resources, and the prompts. Nothing outside those lists is exposed.